




Richard Posner is the most prolific federal judge and aca-
demic in the history of American law.1 He is also among the most 
influential. Posner authored dozens of books and hundreds of ar-
ticles before his retirement from the bench in 2017. He signed 
more than 3,300 judicial opinions.2 Those works are among the 
most cited of any judge.3 They show a constant and wide-ranging 
influence on the law. In the academy, the “differential in terms of 
total influence on the casebooks between Posner and almost all [ ] 
other judges is staggering.”4 
Those facts together mean that this is just the first of many 
symposia that will reflect on Posner’s career as a judge and 
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scholar. But as the authors in this volume have known and 
worked with Posner directly (ten former clerks and two 
University of Chicago colleagues), there is much to be learned 
from the impressions they leave here—not only about Posner but 
perhaps as well about the character of our time. 
Judge Posner came to the bench after an already 
extraordinary academic career. His work in the academy was 
foundational. Posner sketched big pictures, leaving generations 
after him to connect the dots. His casebook, Economic Analysis of 
Law,5 now in its ninth edition,6 is among the most widely read law 
books of our time. It reordered the way scholars (and then 
lawyers) came to think about critical areas of the law. And it 
imposed a certain discipline on anyone trying to make sense of 
how the law should evolve. 
As the authors in this Symposium see it, that academic career 
had an important effect on Posner the judge, especially early on. 
There may be specific areas where his founding of the law-and-
economics movement drove specific doctrinal results7—though I 
remember him admonishing his other clerks and me that he was 
not appointed to impose a theory of economics on the law—but 
the more significant effect comes simply from a discipline of  
pragmatic reason. Rules should make sense. The enterprise of the 
academic is to understand how or whether rules make sense.  
Posner felt entitled to carry that discipline to the bench. 
Throughout his career, he drove the law to make sense in 
pragmatic or consequential terms—at least when there was no 
“ukase”8 that directed differently. 
How the law was to be so driven is a critical question. Posner 
was not a lazy pragmatist, deciding an answer independently of 
doctrine. (Indeed, I recall more than once his reversing an initial 
vote in a case because “the opinion would not write.”) Instead, 
doctrine provided the framework from which Posner built, or to 
which Posner built. Thus, Douglas Baird sees first principles 
guiding Posner’s development of promissory estoppel in contract 
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 8 See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Judiciary: Strengths and Weaknesses 80 (Harvard 
2017). A ukase is a “proclamation by a Russian emperor or government having the force 
of law.” Merriam-Webster, archived at http://perma.cc/5GAJ-CJR2. 
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law, as “the inner logic of the common law rules”9 began an in-
quiry that was then rendered subtle and specific by the specifics 
of the facts. The reverse is true in tort law, as Saul Levmore 
writes: the strategy was again to “use the case as an opportunity 
to interpret inherited law as efficiency enhancing and then to 
make modest changes consistent with this efficiency-minded 
approach.”10 Levmore argues that Posner’s “immediate influence 
[as a judge] might be described as incremental rather than 
monumental, but it is bolstered by the fact that he advanced a 
law-and-economics perspective in a manner that eliminated 
conceptual competitors.”11 That is a similar conclusion to the one 
drawn by Rachel Sachs, who finds little effect in property law 
from Posner the judge but significant effects from Posner the 
academic.12 In each of these cases, these two perspectives work 
together, enhancing the work of the judge while making more 
significant the work of the academic. 
This is big thinking, though in a very specific sense. No doubt, 
there are Dworkin-like judges in America, aiming to make every-
thing make sense according to some deep theory of morality or 
justice.13 We just don’t know who they are because that enter-
prise, within the American legal tradition, cannot succeed. It is 
not within our DNA. It might exist elsewhere—Israel’s Aharon 
Barak, professor and former justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, 
may be the world’s most successful example.14 But within the 
American legal practice, grand thinking is just not productive. 
Yet modest, or maybe pragmatic, big thinking is. (Kathryn 
Judge calls it “humble pragmatis[m].”15) The pragmatist does not 
demand that it all fit together. He does not even insist that this 
corner now under review fits at all. Instead, the pragmatist im-
poses a basic demand of reason, as he insists that the law justify 
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itself. That justification is grounded in “consequences over doc-
trine.”16 Thus, mandamus doctrine gets “ben[t],” Dan Klerman 
writes, to permit a thicker review of certification decisions in class 
action litigation;17 Article III constraints are relaxed, Eugene 
Kontorovich argues, to enable more aggressive judicial review;18 
and multifactor balancing tests get replaced, Yair Listokin in-
sists, with tests focused more directly on the substance of the re-
sults.19 Even when the authors conclude that the judge was ulti-
mately incorrect, the error was motivated by a desire to make the 
law make more practical sense. That is Listokin’s conclusion 
about Posner’s innovation within tax law.20 It is Jennifer Nou’s 
conclusion about his effort to police the boundaries for adminis-
trative law judges’ defense of decisional independence.21 
This more basic constraint of reason over doctrine, over time 
at least, may teach how little in the law makes grand sense. Posner’s 
career certainly evinces that learning. He began with a strong as-
sumption about the inherent efficiency of the common law. That 
view evolved. Klerman describes a “late decadent” stage in the arc 
of Posner’s work.22 But “decadent” is likely precisely the wrong 
word: Posner’s opinions over time simplify the analysis to rely less 
on devices and pretended doctrine and more on the informed judg-
ment of experience, guided by the intricacies of the facts in the 
cases decided. Many lamented this trend, but the lament is better 
directed at the emptiness of law. To Posner, “[t]he cardinal sin of 
most judges and justices . . . is their disingenuous allegiance to a 
formal conception of law.”23 The key word in that sentence is “dis-
ingenuous.” There was nothing Posner hated more than that fla-
vor of fake. 
 
 16 Id at 1090, quoting Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 
100 Cal L Rev 519, 539 (2012). 
 17 Daniel Klerman, Posner and Class Actions, 86 U Chi L Rev 1097, 1103 (2019). 
 18 Eugene Kontorovich, Posner’s Pragmatic Justiciability Jurisprudence: The Tri-
umph of Possibility over Probability, 86 U Chi L Rev 1117, 1130–31 (2019). 
 19 Yair Listokin, Posner on Tax: The Independent Investor Test, 86 U Chi L Rev 1157, 
1162–63 (2019). 
 20 Id at 1170. 
 21 Jennifer Nou, Dismissing Decisional Independence Suits, 86 U Chi L Rev 1187, 
1199–1200 (2019). 
 22 Klerman, 86 U Chi L Rev at 1099 & n 13 (cited in note 17). 
 23 The Judicial Philosophy of Richard Posner (The Economist, Sept 9, 2017), archived 
at http://perma.cc/YPC7-RYZ4. 
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Indeed, maybe surprisingly (until one remembers, as Baird 
reminds us, that Posner was not trained as an economist but in-
stead studied literature24), “the facts” turned out to be the most 
important theory for this founder of the law-and-economics move-
ment. All of us clerks were astonished, in the best possible way, 
with the interest and care with which Posner came to know the 
cases he would decide. Cases were morality plays; Posner was the 
judicial chorus. And as Tim Wu writes, Posner displayed a palpa-
ble desire “to improve the law and prevent its misuse.”25 It was 
just one of his superhuman capabilities that allowed him, practi-
cally always, to be the one most informed about the facts he was 
adjudicating. 
This was in part because Posner did his own work. Unlike 
most federal judges, Posner wrote his own opinions. Clerks were 
critics. But to write a story requires real understanding. That was 
easier for Posner than for many—he wrote and read faster than 
anyone I’ve known. But easier does not mean easy. 
He also had a hunger for work. Kathryn Judge describes a 
fight Posner never needed to pick, triggered by a matured under-
standing of the failures of the market as they applied to fiduciary 
law and mutual funds.26 Judge Frank Easterbrook had written an 
opinion more skeptical of the judges than of the market. Posner, 
who would complete two books reflecting on the market’s collapse 
in the 2008 financial crisis, was not as convinced of the rationality 
of that market. And thus he was open to a rule that would allow 
the law to challenge the market or, more specifically, as Judge 
puts it, one that would reject the assumption that “markets are 
far better than judges.”27 That standard, Posner argued, was more 
consistent with the existing legal rule and more consistent with 
reality. 
The Supreme Court was the less-than-inspiring adult who 
stepped onto the field to end the judicial quarrel. The Court’s 
opinion celebrated not reason but the lobotomization of federal 
courts. The questions that had divided Easterbrook and Posner, 
the Court suggested, were too difficult for the judges. They were 
 
 24 Baird, 86 U Chi L Rev 1055–56 (cited in note 9). 
 25 Tim Wu, On Posner on Copyright, 86 U Chi L Rev 1217, 1219 (2019). 
 26 Judge, 86 U Chi L Rev at 1081–84 (cited in note 15). 
 27 Id at 1088. 
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for Congress. The Court thus backed away from Easterbrook’s in-
novation and Posner’s clarified standard. The manner of judge as 
tinkerer was rejected. Judge as “robot” was affirmed.28 
The manner of judge as tinkerer works well (or safely) only 
in a judge with a certain character. Posner was not a populist. He 
didn’t feign that all were equal in capability or insight. Yet he 
consistently pushed ego out of his chambers. His clerks were to 
call him by his first name. They were to criticize his opinions 
openly and forcefully—and not just while they were clerks. One 
summer, after I had become a law professor, I spent a month in 
Budapest teaching law. These were the days before email, so to 
send comments on a draft book Posner was completing, I had to 
use the fax. We had an increasingly heated exchange over a num-
ber of days, and finally, one evening, I sent a letter I regretted. It 
was too critical, and unfairly so. I immediately sent an apology. I 
had “gone too far,” I told him. The next morning, I received his 
answer. I could never “go too far,” Posner wrote. “I am surrounded 
by sycophants,” he lamented. The last thing he needed was for 
me, or anyone, to pull punches or, as Judge puts it, “to spend time 
with otherwise intelligent people rendered mute by his glow.”29 
This was a self-awareness of what it would take to be the kind of 
judge that he wanted to be. To self-consciously relax (what he re-
garded as) the pretense of legal constraint required simultane-
ously boosting a practice of professional constraint. Posner as a 
scholar studied that practice in the correspondence of judges such 
as Cardozo and Holmes.30 He lived it as a judge in the exchange 
with clerks and colleagues. So long as he was convinced that you 
were disinterested—a condition that the lawyers in the cases 
would not satisfy—he was eager to hear criticism and, in the or-
dinary case, engage it. That criticism had an effect—even, as 
Hemphill writes, against the earlier positions taken by Posner the 
academic.31 
This practice mattered to the law. For example, Posner 
grabbed the field of intellectual property and, as Tim Wu and  
 
 28 Id at 1092. 
 29 Id at 1085. 
 30 See Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation 31–32 (Chicago 1990). See 
also generally Richard A. Posner, ed, The Essential Holmes: Selections from the Letters, 
Speeches, Judicial Opinions, and Other Writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. xiii–xiv 
(Chicago 1992). 
 31 As Hemphill writes, although one of Posner’s first antitrust opinions affirmed an 
argument he had advanced as an academic, one of his last antitrust opinions rejected an 
argument he had made as a scholar. Hemphill, 86 U Chi L Rev at 1062, 1073 (cited in note 7). 
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Jonathan Masur describe, changed its development. In part that 
change was substantive: as Wu argues, Posner evolved the law of 
characters and fair use in copyright,32 and in patent law, as Masur 
describes, “he laid out a comprehensive economic theory of the 
circumstances under which a patent holder’s actions will or will 
not constitute violations of antitrust law.”33 
But more than specifics, Posner changed the course of the de-
bate within the field of intellectual property. Masur notes a pro-
found effect on patent law once “Posner argued, more explicitly 
than any other federal judge ever had, that the courts had gone 
too far in expanding the powers of patent owners.”34 Posner was 
the one who brought “criticism of the patent system writ large [ ] 
from the academy to the judiciary,” Masur writes, leading it 
across “the law’s version of the blood-brain barrier.”35 Once Posner 
“began to describe the ills of the patent system, the tide seemed 
to turn decisively against the advocates of ever-stronger pa-
tents.”36 This had, as Masur concludes, “as much of an impact on 
patent law as judges who [had] focused on that field throughout 
their entire careers.”37 
There was a similar effect within copyright law. As the inter-
net put pressure on old ways of profiting from creativity, the 
courts were initially quite skeptical of dot-com innovations. Cases 
like UMG Recordings, Inc v MP3.com, Inc,38 were extraordinary 
in their punitive and unthinking embrace of the old against the 
new. But when Posner penned an essay questioning this extrem-
ism, it was as if a boil had been lanced.39 The courts have become 
the most important source of sensible evolution in the doctrine of 
copyright as applied to digital technologies. Posner didn’t cause 
that evolution, yet his writing made it respectable. 
These were fields that had become stuck either through a 
stacked judiciary (patents) or a fundamental shift in technology 
(copyright). Posner’s effect here was thus quite visible. 
 
 32 See generally Wu, 86 U Chi L Rev at 1223–39 (cited in note 25). 
 33 Jonathan S. Masur, Posner’s Unlikely Patent Intervention, 86 U Chi L Rev 1171, 
1176 (2019). 
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 35 Id at 1185. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Masur, 86 U Chi L Rev at 1172 (cited in note 33). 
 38 92 F Supp 2d 349 (SDNY 2000). 
 39 See generally William F. Patry and Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory 
Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92 Cal L Rev 1639 (2004). 
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But not just here. The essays in this Symposium span a wide 
range of Judge Posner’s judicial work. Three focus on the common 
law—contract,40 tort,41 and property law.42 Four on putatively 
statutory fields—copyright,43 patents,44 tax,45 and antitrust.46 Two 
touch roughly constitutional norms, as they consider the limits of 
federal policing of the administrative state47 and judicial policing 
of its own jurisdiction.48 One considers directly the work of courts, 
and the doctrines that might add to the efficacy of courts doing 
justice.49 And one hides a strong view about the character of this 
judge under an essay putatively about a fight over fiduciary obli-
gations with mutual funds.50 
Whatever the quibbles, all reveal a common respect for the 
extraordinary work of a judge not hesitant to press pragmatic rea-
son into law. All of the authors in this volume are academics. It is 
in our nature to admire such a commitment. None of us could im-
agine a life that had achieved it as effectively. And some of us 
(Judge and Wu, especially, and I would add myself to this list too) 
can’t imagine another serving in the model of Posner—not be-
cause humanity won’t produce talent as impressive (not many, 
but some) but because our politics has made the idea of such peo-
ple becoming judges all but impossible. Ours is an age, Wu says, 
“in which we celebrate the individual but recoil from any real in-
stantiation of individuality.”51 Posner is the quintessential indi-
vidual; thus there will never be another Posner on the federal 
bench.52 
Never is a long time. And as there is so much reason for our 
politics to solve the fundamental cause of that crisis, perhaps it 
will be solved, permitting once again a judiciary that can include 
a more colorful mix than the merely inscrutable or predictably 
loyal. Yet whether it can or not, none of us can doubt how rare 
and deep the influence of this judge has been, not just on us, or 
 
 40 See generally Baird, 86 U Chi L Rev 1037 (cited in note 9). 
 41 See generally Levmore, 86 U Chi L Rev 1137 (cited in note 10). 
 42 See generally Sachs, 86 U Chi L Rev 1201 (cited in note 12). 
 43 See generally Wu, 86 U Chi L Rev 1217 (cited in note 25). 
 44 See generally Masur, 86 U Chi L Rev 1171 (cited in note 33). 
 45 See generally Listokin, 86 U Chi L Rev 1157 (cited in note 19). 
 46 See generally Hemphill, 86 U Chi L Rev 1057 (cited in note 7). 
 47 See generally Nou, 86 U Chi L Rev 1187 (cited in note 21). 
 48 See generally Kontorovich, 86 U Chi L Rev 1117 (cited in note 18). 
 49 See generally Klerman, 86 U Chi L Rev 1097 (cited in note 17). 
 50 See generally Judge, 86 U Chi L Rev 1077 (cited in note 15). 
 51 Wu, 86 U Chi L Rev at 1221 (cited in note 25). 
 52 Id. 
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the law, but on the ideals of anyone who would practice the very 
best of what the law could be. 
